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This article is reprinted and adapted with permission from: Owen D.
Jones, Joshua W. Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall & René Marois, Brain
Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 5, for the convenience of the reader who would benefit from
background information about neuroscience and the law prior to
reading the other articles in this issue. The full text of the article,
including an example of how to read a brain-imaging study, is avail-
able online at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563612. Additional back-
ground materials have been collected by the MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience: http://lawneuro.org/
resources.php, and in extensive coursebook materials, OWEN D.
JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
(2014) (www.vanderbilt.edu/lawbrain).   
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It has become increasingly common for brain images to beproffered as evidence in civil and criminal litigation.1 Thisarticle offers some general guidelines to judges about how to
understand brain-imaging studies—or at least avoid misunder-
standing them. (An appendix annotating a published brain-
imaging study, in order to illustrate and explain, with step-by-
step commentary, is available in the full text online.2)
Brain images are offered in legal proceedings for a variety of
purposes, as Professors Carter Snead and Gary Marchant have
usefully surveyed.3 On the civil side, neuroimaging has been
offered in constitutional, personal injury, disability benefit, and
contract cases, among others. For example, in Entertainment
Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,4 the court considered whether a
brain-imaging study could be used to show that exposure to
violent video games increases aggressive thinking and behavior
in adolescents. In Fini v. General Motors Corp.,5 brain scans were
proffered to help determine the extent of head injuries from a
car accident. In Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retire-
ment Plan,6 a former professional football player proffered brain
scans in an effort to prove entitlement to neuro-degenerative
disability benefits. And in Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank &
Trust Co.,7 involving a dispute over the sale of land, the defen-
dant introduced brain images to prove mental incompetency,
resulting in a voidable contract.
In criminal cases, brain images are sometimes invoked to
support an argument that a defendant is incompetent to stand
trial. In United States v. Kasim, for example, Kasim was found to
be demented, and incompetent to stand trial for Medicaid
fraud, on the basis of medical testimony that included brain
images.8 Brain images are also increasingly proffered by the
defense at the guilt-determination phase, in an effort to negate
the mens rea element of a crime, and to thereby avoid convic-
tion. For example, in People v. Weinstein,9 a defendant accused
of strangling his wife and throwing her from a 12th floor win-
dow sought to introduce images of a brain defect, in support of
an argument that he was not responsible for his act. And in Peo-
ple v. Goldstein,10 a defendant sought to introduce a brain image
of an abnormality, in an effort to prove an insanity defense, after
he pushed a woman in front of a subway train, killing her.
Brain images have also been proffered at the sentencing
phase of criminal cases, in furtherance of mitigation. For exam-
ple, in Oregon v. Kinkel,11 a boy convicted of killing and injur-
ing fellow students in a high school cafeteria sought to intro-
duce brain images of abnormalities, in an effort to secure a more
lenient sentence. Brain images have been offered—in Coe v.
State,12 for example—to argue that a convicted murderer is not
competent to be executed. And accessibility to brain-imaging
technology has even been litigated—in Ferrell v. State13 and Peo-
ple v. Morgan14 for instance—in the context of a claim that a
defense counsel’s failure to procure a brain image for the defen-
dant amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
For better or worse, the full complement of cases at the
44 Court Review - Volume 50  
Brain Imaging for Judges:
An Introduction to Law and Neuroscience
Owen D. Jones, Joshua W. Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall, & René Marois
15. One of the many efforts underway, within the MacArthur Founda-
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Teneille Brown to find all actual and attempted uses of neuroimag-
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of whether such uses are mentioned in published opinions.
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(Dale Purves et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
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are broadly concerned about misunderstandings among laypeo-
ple. A non-exhaustive list of important cautionary and explana-
tory articles, which have influenced some of our approaches
below, include: John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You’re Imag-
ing the Brain Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop Using Your Head: A Primer
and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 650
(2003); Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5
PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007); Eric Racine et al., fMRI in the Public
Eye, 6 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 159 (2005); J.D. Trout, Seduc-
tion Without Cause: Uncovering Explanatory Neurophilia, 12
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 281 (2008); Society of Nuclear Medicine
Brain Imaging Council, Ethical Clinical Practice of Functional
Brain Imaging, 37 J. NUCLEAR MED. 1256 (1996); Michael S. Gaz-
zaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412 (2008); Joseph
H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimag-
ing in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007); Russell A.
Poldrack et al., Guidelines for Reporting an fMRI Study, 40 NEU-
ROIMAGE 409 (2008); Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and
What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 869 (2008); WILLIAM
R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: WHAT EVERY LAWYER
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE MIND AND THE BRAIN (2008). One of the
works most critical of how brain-imaging results can be inter-
preted is WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF
LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN (2003).
intersection of neuroscience and law is now too large for com-
prehensive overview—in part because many of the cases do not
result in reported decisions.15 While there is no denying that
brain imaging is a powerful tool, whether used for medical or
legal purposes, it is also clear that, like any tool, brain imaging
can be used for good or for ill, skillfully or sloppily, and in ways
useful or irrelevant.
We are concerned that brain imaging can be misused by
lawyers (intentionally or unintentionally) and misunderstood
by judges and jurors. Consequently, our aim in this article is to
provide information about the operation and interpretation of
brain-imaging techniques, in hopes that it will increase the
extent to which imaging is properly interpreted, and conversely
decrease the extent to which it is misunderstood or misused. 
Part I of the article provides some very brief background on
modern brain imaging, with particular emphasis on one wide-
spread and powerful technique, known as functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). The physics of fMRI, and the statis-
tics accompanying the analyses that generate brain images, are
complicated. We will make no effort to provide a comprehen-
sive or detailed exploration of the subject. There are many
existing textbooks that cover this material to great depths, often
far greater than judges will need to master, for the specific con-
texts in which brain images are (potentially) legally relevant.16
Instead, we will aim here to focus on what a judge needs to
know in order to have a basic understanding of what works
how and why. Our goal is to present this in an accessible way,
recognizing (as we trust our readers to allow us) that simplify-
ing discussions are illustrative of general principles, but obvi-
ously ignore the richer detail that enables deeper appreciation
of important caveats and subtleties.
Part II of this article then turns to provide, in brief and acces-
sible overview, a variety of key concepts to understand about the
legal, biological, and brain-imaging contexts at this particular
law/neuroscience intersection, as well as a variety of guidelines
we (and in some cases others) recommend to help avoid the var-
ious factual errors, logical traps,
and analytic missteps that can all
too quickly lead away from sound
and sensible understandings of
what brain images can mean—and
equally what they cannot. Make no
mistake: we are not the only
researchers concerned about poten-
tial misunderstandings of brain
images.17 A great many cautions
have been swirling about in the lit-
erature, often offering multiple ver-
sions of key and basic points about
the limitations of the technologies, and we hope here to distill
some of those, add others, and explain the set in a way that we
hope provides a concise and useful introduction to judges
approaching this interdisciplinary nexus for the first time.
The online appendix to this article then provides a concrete
illustration of how to read an fMRI study. We will not over-
claim. Some of the details of fMRI defy short descriptions,
involve technical details unlikely to be relevant in legal con-
texts, or both. On the other hand, much of the technical jargon,
and many of the basic concepts one will encounter in an fMRI
study, are clear with just a little explanation, oriented toward
the audience we anticipate. We attempt to provide this in an
accessible, informative way—assuming no particular scientific
sophistication of the reader.
Specifically, the core of the online appendix is a 2008 fMRI
study (co-authored by three of us and others) that used fMRI
techniques to investigate how brains are activated during pun-
ishment decisions. Though we do not anticipate that the sub-
stantive findings will necessarily find immediate utility in liti-
gation, we believe that judges reading an fMRI study will learn
most from a study that inherently addressed matters relevant to
law—in this case, the decision whether or not to punish some-
one for criminal behavior and, if so, how much.
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18. This signal is used in conjunction with measures like heart rate
and skin electrical conductance to constitute the polygraph pro-
cedure that is used commonly in a context of detecting deception.
Although used commonly by the U.S. government and police
departments, the fundamental limitations of these procedures
have been thoroughly described. See, e.g., COMM. TO REVIEW THE
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003).
19. STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL
TECHNIQUE (2005). Some have attempted to use ERP signals in
legal settings, but the limitations of this approach are well known
and can serve as lessons for the interpretation of brain-imaging
information.
20. The leading “f” remains lowercase, by convention.
21. See generally HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 16.
22. There are varying opinions in the neuroscience community about
how conclusive an understanding there is of the fMRI signal’s rela-
tionship to the activity of neurons, and about how much fMRI can
reveal—beyond where brain activation occurred—about behavior
and mental states. See, e.g., Logothetis, supra note 17; Poldrack et
al., supra note 17. 
23. Magnetic fields are described in Tesla units. A 3-Tesla machine
(which uses super-cooled electrical coils) generates a magnetic
field roughly 60,000 times the magnetic field of the Earth.
To facilitate that learning in
this concrete application, the
Stanford Technology Law Review
generously afforded us the
unique opportunity to annotate
the article in the margin with
explanations of various terms
and contexts, as they appear
throughout the study. 
I. BRAIN IMAGING: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW
There are many kinds of brain images. All readers are likely
familiar with the way x-rays, and the closely aligned technique
known as computed tomography (CT) scanning, can show vari-
ous structural anomalies in the body, including in the brain. In
these techniques, radiation aimed at and passing through the
body forms images on photographic film. The varying density of
different tissues in the body results in varying levels of radiation
reaching the film—creating, in turn, an image of internal struc-
tures. (For example, bone tissue appears as white, while soft tis-
sue appears gray.) CT scanning varies from conventional x-rays
by virtue of collecting images from multiple angles rotating
around the body, which images are then combined by computers
into cross-sectional representations. These techniques (like mag-
netic resonance imaging, which will be discussed in a moment)
are used for information about how various parts of the body are
structured. They can show whether structures are intact, and can
reveal damage, atrophy, intrusions, and developmental anom-
alies. They do not, however, collect or provide information about
how those body parts are actually functioning.
PET, which refers to positron emission tomography, is one of
the techniques that enable researchers to learn about how the
brain functions, as it is actually doing so. With PET, a researcher
injects a subject with radioactive tracers that move through the
bloodstream and accumulate in different locations and concen-
trations in the brain, over time, as different parts of the brain
increase and decrease activity (such as glucose metabolism) that
is associated with brain function. (A similar technique, known
as SPECT, uses single photon emission computed tomography.)
EEG and MEG, short for electroencephalography and mag-
netoencephalography respectively, record electromagnetic fluc-
tuations in various parts of the brain, as the brain is function-
ing, using non-invasive sensors applied to the scalp.18 In
research laboratories, the EEG signals can be analyzed in rela-
tion to stimuli or responses to obtain event-related potentials
(ERP), which were used before brain imaging was developed to
make inferences about the brain processes underlying percep-
tual, cognitive, and motor processes.19
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging20) uses the
technology of regular magnetic resonance imaging adapted to
detect changes in hemodynamic (literally “blood movement”)
properties of the brain occurring when the subject is engaged in
very specific mental tasks. In a nutshell (and with a reminder
that we are over-simplifying for heuristic purposes) here’s how
it works.
At its most basic, fMRI can be understood as a tool for learn-
ing which regions of the brain are working, how much, and for
how long, during particular tasks. In much the same way that
the body delivers more oxygen to muscles that are working
harder, the body delivers more oxygen to brain regions that
work harder. The fMRI technique measures blood oxygenation
levels—within small cubic volumes of brain tissue known as
“voxels”—as those levels change across time with the varying
metabolic demands of active neurons.21 Changes in demand for
oxygen are widely considered to be reliable proxies for inferring
the fluctuating activity of the underlying neural tissue.22
The physical principles underlying fMRI are quite complex.
But in general terms the technology works as follows: An fMRI
machine creates and manipulates a primary magnetic field,23 as
well as several smaller magnetic fields (one in each three-
dimensional plane) that can be quickly varied in orientation
and uniformity. Recall (from basic physics) that protons within
the nuclei of atoms spin on an axis and carry a positive charge.
As they spin, these electric charges form what can be thought
of as tiny magnets. When a person is inserted (typically hori-
zontally) into the open bore of an fMRI machine, the previ-
ously random axes of spin, for many protons, align, like iron
filings along a magnet. That is, the axes begin to point in the
same direction. Researchers then administer to the subject’s
head brief radio frequency pulses (which usually originate
from a device looking rather like a small birdcage that sur-
rounds the subject’s head). Those pulses deflect the protons’
axes of spin temporarily. When the pulses stop, the axes grad-
ually return to their original orientation, releasing energy dur-
ing that “relaxation” process. The machine can detect charac-
teristics of the released energy because it depends on a proton’s
“local” magnetic environment, and this environment is
affected by the relative concentrations of oxygenated and
deoxygenated blood in local brain tissue. Crucially, as these
concentrations are affected by regional changes in brain activ-
ity, they provide indirect markers of neural activity that form
the basis of the fMRI signal. The machine enables localization
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24. MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TES-
TIMONY (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2006). Chapter One pro-
vides an excellent overview of the “general acceptance” and valid-
ity tests. It examines the cases that established those tests and dis-
cusses subsequent cases that applied and further developed those
tests. 
25. Interested readers can find further information about these back-
ground principles in a variety of sources (as well as in the citations
that they, in turn, provide). See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Schall, On Building
a Bridge Between Brain and Behavior, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 23
(2004). 
of these signals in space—i.e. “spatial resolution”—by collect-
ing them from many different “slices” of the brain. And the
technique enables localization of these signals in time—i.e.,
“temporal resolution”—by recording the signals many times
over a period of several seconds for each mental event. A
“stack” of slices comprising the whole brain is acquired every
couple of seconds or so, enabling the rapid collection of many
of these three-dimensional “volumes” of brain activity over the
period of an experimental paradigm.
II. KEY CONCEPTS AND GUIDELINES
This part is divided into four sections. These address the legal
context, the biological context, the intersection of law and biol-
ogy, and finally, with that preparatory background, the brain-
imaging context. We proceed in this way because one cannot
gain a clear understanding of brain imaging, and its intersection
with the legal system, without first considering the underlying
legal and biological contexts, and their background interactions.
A. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
With terrific, new, whiz-bang technology—which can reveal
inner structures and workings of the brain—it is all too tempt-
ing to jump past the more mundane legal issues, and to race to
apply new techniques to solve new problems in new ways.
But hold the horses. Although our principal purpose here is
to discuss how to read (and not read) brain-imaging evidence,
we would be remiss not to first anchor the discussion in the
legal contexts in which those images might, arguably, be
admissible. The territory here is broad, and could occupy us
for some time. But to be brief, there are a variety of questions
to keep in mind at the outset in order to understand the spe-
cific legal context in which brain imaging might be considered
in the courtroom.
The threshold consideration, of course, is: Are the proffered
brain images relevant? Because behavior comes from the brain,
and the legal system often cares not only about how someone
acted but also why, it is tempting to assume that brain images
of people important to the litigation will provide legally rele-
vant information, of one sort or another. But this is, in fact, not
a decision to reach lightly.
What specific legal questions do the images purportedly
address? Contexts vary considerably, even within the civil and
criminal halves of the docket (each of which bears differing
underlying standards of proof). Within civil cases, for example,
there are a wide variety of different legal purposes into which
brain images might conceivably plug. Are brain images prof-
fered to help establish liability, such as in the case of a medical
malpractice action? To demonstrate a pre-existing condition,
such as in the case of a dispute over insurance coverage? To
help estimate damages, such as in the case of a car accident?
And within criminal cases, are brain images proffered during
the liability phase, in an effort to
defeat the prosecution’s claim that
the defendant had (and was there-
fore capable of having) the mental
state requisite for conviction? Are
they instead proffered during the
sentencing phase, in an effort to
mitigate penalty? Are they proffered
as evidence of lying or truthfulness?
It is important to remember that
the admissibility of brain images is
not simply a matter of whether they
are scientifically sound. The poten-
tial relevance and hence admissibility of brain images will vary,
according to the specific legal issue at hand within civil and crim-
inal contexts. Put another way, the admissibility of brain images
depends largely on their perceived potential relevance (if any)
to the issue to be determined, independent of (and often before)
considering the quality and interpretation of the specific images
themselves.
What, specifically, do the images allegedly demonstrate, and
how well does that connect to the legal issues at hand? Some of the
many variables that may come into play here include: Are these
structural or functional images? When were they taken? (For
example, before or after events in question?) How recently?
Under what circumstances were they procured? (For example,
what specific mental tasks was the subject executing during
functional imaging?) What is being compared to what? (For
example: Are these before and after images of the same brain?
Are these comparisons between a party’s brain and a group-
averaged composite, for contrast?)
What are the applicable standards for the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence? As is well known, the federal and state systems
can have (and often do have) different standards for the admis-
sion of scientific evidence. And the state standards vary among
the states. It is therefore necessary to note that the backdrop of
all that follows below is the specific legal regime under which
images are to be evaluated for potential relevance, within the
specific context of the specific matters in dispute. Although it is
not our purpose here to explore the applicability of scientific-
evidence law to brain images, we would be remiss not to flag
the centrality of evidentiary rules and contexts to all that fol-
lows. Interested readers will find comprehensive discussion of
scientific evidence generally in the treatise MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE.24
B. THE BIOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Understanding the potential relevance of brain images to law
also requires a few words of general background about the rela-
tionship between biology and behavior generally. Key things to
keep in mind (generally speaking) include:25
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26. Yes, the alert reader will point out that some behavior, such as
reflexes, leaps right out of the spinal cord. In the text, we are
speaking in generalities. 
27. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behav-
ioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). See also LAW & THE
BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2006); LAW, MIND,
AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2009);
THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW (Nita Fara-
hany ed., 2009); Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in
Context, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 81 (2006); bibliographic
sources compiled on the website of The Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law (www.sealsite.org). 
28. For more details, see sources cited supra note 16.
• All behavior results from the
interaction of genes, environ-
ments (including social con-
texts), developmental history,
and the evolutionary processes
that built the brain to function
in the ways it does.
• Behavior originates in the phys-
ical and chemical activities of
the brain.26
• All behavior is thus “biologi-
cal.”
• Understanding behavior as biological in nature does not
mean that behavior is “biologically determined” in a reduc-
tionist or reliably predictive way.
• The brain is an evolved information-processing organ that,
generally speaking, and through differing processes, associ-
ates various environmental inputs with various behavioral
outputs.
• Those environmental influences are (generally speaking)
unique for each individual.
• Each person’s brain, though highly flexible, is both anatom-
ically and functionally specialized. (That is, brains do not
consist of undifferentiated all-purpose tissue.)
• Humans share, across the species, a common brain plan of
anatomical and functional specialization.
• Each brain is slightly different in size, shape, and other
anatomical features.
• One area of the brain can affect multiple behaviors.
• A given behavior arises from multiple areas of the brain.
• Different individuals can use different parts of the brain, in
different ways, on the same cognitive tasks.
• Behavior is a complex phenomenon, neither attributable to
single causes, nor easily parsed among multiple causes.
• Cognitive phenomena rarely originate from a single region
in the brain.
C. THE INTERSECTIONS OF BIOLOGY AND LAW
The potential relevance of brain imaging to law must be
evaluated against the broader background of the intersections
of law and human biology (both structural and behavioral)
generally.27
• Like the rest of behavior, both criminal and law-abiding
behavior originates in the brain.
• There is no brain structure, or set of brain structures, that is
specifically “for” criminal or law-abiding behavior (since
those categorizations of behavior are socially determined).
• To say that brain features influence behavior relevant to
crime does not mean that brain features can necessarily
explain why certain individuals behaved criminally.
• No explanation of any kind, brain-based or otherwise, has
an automatic bearing on justification or exculpation or mit-
igation in law.
• Legal responsibility for behavior is a legal conclusion, not a
scientific finding.
• Establishing a “biological basis” for behavior carries no
automatic, normative relevance to anything (legal or other-
wise).
• Norms, though influenced by biology, can never be justified
by biology alone.
D. THE BRAIN-IMAGING CONTEXT (USING FMRI)
With that brief but foundational background, drawing atten-
tion to the legal and biological contexts, and to their interac-
tion, we can now turn to discuss key concepts about brain
imaging that judges should know:28
1. Anatomical imaging and functional imaging are impor-
tantly different.
Two anatomical images, taken one minute apart, will ordi-
narily look identical. Yet two functional images, from data col-
lected one minute apart, could look completely different. One
reason this is so is simply that, in the latter case, brain activity
changes rapidly. Another reason is because fMRI brain images
are built statistically, not recorded photographically. In the typ-
ical fMRI case, hundreds of recordings are made of each voxel
in the brain, at slightly different times (e.g., every two seconds).
Each recording of each voxel within a given trial is analogous
to a single frame in a movie. Learning what happens within
each voxel, over time, is akin to watching motion seem to
emerge from the successive snapshots that comprise a moving
picture. But that metaphor only captures part of the fMRI tech-
nique, because there are subsequently many repeat recordings
of that voxel, under similar conditions, on many consecutive
trials—the results of which are typically then averaged across
trials. Complicating matters further is that there are about
100,000 voxels within the brain, and what typically matters is
how neural activity within those voxels is varying over time, in
relation to some task a subject undertakes while being scanned.
Furthermore, within each voxel are millions of neurons of dif-
ferent types, interacting in ways that could be mechanistically
different but indistinguishable from the measure of fMRI. In the
end, fMRI brain images lay the result of any one of many possi-
ble statistical tests overtop of an anatomical image of a selected
slice of the brain. That is, an fMRI image is a composite of an
anatomical image, of the researcher’s choosing, and a statistical
representation of the brain activity in that image, also of the
researcher’s choosing.
2. Functional brain imaging is not mind reading.
There is more to a thought than blood flow and oxygen.
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29. There appear to be some exceptions. See, e.g., John-Dylan Haynes
et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURRENT
BIOLOGY 323 (2007) (determining through brain imaging, with up
to 71% accuracy, which of two tasks a person is covertly intend-
ing to perform); Y. Kamitani & F. Tong, Decoding the Visual and
Subjective Contents of the Human Brain, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
679 (2005) (determining through brain imaging, with near 80%
accuracy, which of two overlapping visual patterns a person is
paying attention to); S. A. Harrison & F. Tong, Decoding Reveals
the Contents of Visual Working Memory in Early Visual Areas, 458
NATURE 632–35 (2009) (determining through brain imaging, with
83-86% accuracy, which of two visual patterns a person is actively
maintaining in memory).
30. Consider this quote from a popular account: 
With PET, for example, a depressed brain will show up
in cold, brain-inactive deep blues, dark purples, and hunter
greens; the same brain when hypomanic however, is lit up
like a Christmas tree, with vivid patches of bright reds and
yellows and oranges. Never has the color and structure of
science so completely captured the cold inward deadness of
depression or the vibrant, active engagement of mania. 
KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND
MADNESS 196 (1995). Our point here is that the colors used are
arbitrary, and may have been represented in this way to create pre-
cisely this impression. 
fMRI is very good at discovering where brain tissue is active
(commonly by highlighting differences between brain activa-
tions during different cognitive tasks). But differences are not
thoughts. fMRI can show differences in brain activation across
locations, across time, and across tasks. But that often does not
enable any reliable conclusion about precisely what a person is
thinking.29
3. Scanners don’t create fMRI brain images; people create
fMRI brain images.
Images are only as good as the manner in which the
researcher designed the specific task or experiment, deployed
the machine, collected the data, analyzed the results, and gen-
erated the images. It is important to remember that fMRI
images are the result of a process about a process. Multiple
choices and multiple steps go into determining exactly what
data will be collected, how, and when—as well as into how the
data will be analyzed and how it will be presented.
4. Group-averaged and individual brain images are
importantly different.
Most brain-imaging research is directed toward understand-
ing how the average brain, within a subject population, is acti-
vated during different tasks. This is not at all the same thing as
saying either that all brains performing the same task activate in
the average way, or saying that the activation of a single brain
can tell us anything meaningful about the operation of the aver-
age brain. Consequently:
Do not assume that the scan of any individual is
necessarily representative of any group.
Do not assume that the averaged scan of any group
will necessarily be representative of any individual.
5. There is no inherent meaning to the color on an fMRI
brain image.
fMRI does not detect colors in the brain. fMRI images use
colors—of whatever segment of the rainbow the researcher
prefers—to signify the result of a statistical test. By convention,
the brighter the color (say, yellow compared to orange) the
greater the statistical significance of the differences in brain
activity between two conditions. Put another way, the brighter
the color, the less likely it is that the differences in brain activ-
ity in that voxel or region, between two different cognitive
tasks, was due to chance alone. As with any color-coded repre-
sentation, accurate interpretation requires knowing exactly
what each color represents in absolute terms. The researcher
specifies what each color will represent, and this matters. Yel-
low might mean that there is only one chance in 1,000 that the
difference between brain activa-
tions in this voxel, between con-
ditions, is due to random chance.
Or, yellow might mean that there
is one chance in 20 that the differ-
ence is due to random chance.30
6. fMRI brain images do
not speak for themselves.
No fMRI brain image has auto-
matic, self-evident significance.
Even well-designed, well-exe-
cuted, properly analyzed, properly generated images must have
their import, in context, interpreted.
7. Classification of an anatomical or behavioral feature of
the brain as normal or abnormal is not a simple thing.
Because we have learned a great deal about the brain, from
dissection, imaging, and the like, we have some confidence
about what a typical brain looks like, and how a typical brain
functions. But even without full anatomical scans of everyone
on the planet, we know there is considerable variation—both
anatomically and functionally—within some general parame-
ters. That means that it can be (with some exceptions, such as
a bullet lodged in the brain) difficult to say with precision how
uncommon a given feature or functional pattern may be, even
if it appears to be atypical. Base rates for anatomical or func-
tional conditions are often unknown. For example: suppose
brain images show that a defendant has an abnormal brain fea-
ture. We often do not have any idea how many people with
nearly identical abnormalities do not behave as the defendant
did. How, then, to make a reasonable conclusion about the
causal effect of the brain condition?
8. Even when an atypical feature of function is identified,
understanding the meaning of that is considerably
complex.
Brain images can show unique features and functions of a
person’s brain. But the meaning of them is rarely self-evident.
Determining which of those are important, and how, depends
not only on the legal context for which the images are offered,
but also on expert analysis of what the images do and do not
mean. For example, suppose that measurement of the fMRI-
detected signal during a given cognitive task indicates that a
person has less neural activity in a given region than the aver-
age person. Does that mean that the person is somehow cogni-
tively impaired in that region? Or might it alternatively indi-
cate that the person has more expertise or experience than
Court Review - Volume 50 49
“[W]e have
some confidence
about what a
typical brain
looks like, and
how a typical
brain functions.”
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eds., 2006); LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver R.
Goodenough eds., 2009); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND,
AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent Garland ed., 2004); George J.
Annas, Foreword: Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neu-
roethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163 (2007); Bruce A.
Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: The Case of
Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 457 (2007); Abram
S. Barth, Note and Comment, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of
Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501
(2007); Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH.
U. L.R. 859 (2009); Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom
Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.
L. CONTEXT 233 (2006); Brent Garland & Paul W. Glimcher, Cog-
nitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBI-
OLOGY 130 (2006); Steven Goldberg, MRIs and the Perception of
Risk, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 229 (2007); Oliver R. Goodenough, Map-
ping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and Moral Intu-
ition, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 429 (2001); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience
and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1103 (2008); Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological
Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139 (2008); Henry T. Greely &
Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377 (2007); Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIO-
LOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004); Charles N. W. Keckler, Cross Examining
the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility
average, requiring less cognitive
effort? 
9. Correlation is (still) not cau-
sation.
The fact that two things vary in
parallel tells us little about whether
the two are necessarily causally
related and, if so, which causes
which. For example, suppose brain
imaging reveals that 70% of
inmates on death row for homicide
have atypical brain activation in a
given region, compared to normal,
unincarcerated subjects. That statistic does not mean that the
brain activation pattern causes homicidal behavior. It might
mean that having murdered affects brain activations, or that
being incarcerated for long periods of time affects brain activa-
tions, or something else entirely.
10. Today’s brain is not yesterday’s brain.
In all but the most fanciful of contexts, a brain scan likely
takes place long after the behavior (such as criminal activity)
that gives rise to the scan. Drawing causal inferences is there-
fore further complicated. People’s brains change with age and
experience. And some proportion of the population will
develop atypical anatomical or functional conditions over time.
If a defendant is scanned six months or six years after the act in
question, and the scan detects an abnormality, it is not a simple
matter to conclude with confidence that the same abnormality
was present at the time in question or—even if one assumes so,
arguendo—that it would have meaningfully affected behavior.
11. Scanners (in theory) detect what they are built, pro-
grammed, and instructed to detect, in the way they
are built, programmed, and instructed to detect it.
Scanners are highly complex and often unique pieces of
machinery. So (as in other areas of science) are the people who
calibrate, program, operate, and interpret collected data. It is
important to recognize that the product of these intersecting
complexities may or may not be reliable, generalizable, and
replicable.
12. fMRI brain imaging enables inferences about the
mind, built on inferences about neural activity, built
on the detection of physiological functions believed to
be reliably associated with brain activity.
It is important to remember that fMRI does not provide a
direct measure of neuronal activity—as do, for example, inva-
sive techniques that measure single neuron recordings. fMRI
detects fluctuations in oxygen concentrations thought to be
reliably associated with neuronal activity. But the precise rela-
tionship between metabolic demands and neuronal function
remains poorly understood.
Even if regional activations in brain images reflect true
neural activity, it should also be kept in mind that our ability to
confidently infer the cognitive process that must have led to
such regional activation is highly constrained. This is because
neuroscientists still understand so little about what the various
regions of the human brain contribute to a particular cognitive
function.
CONCLUSION
We have provided above a very brief introduction to the
intersection of brain imaging and law principally intended for
those judges relatively new to this interdisciplinary intersec-
tion. This article also provides some scientific context for the
other articles in this special issue of Court Review.
As reflected in the numerous citations and descriptions of
neuroscience matters in the other articles in the special issue,
courts are already frequently confronted with issues concerning
the admissibility and proper interpretation of brain images. And
all present indicators suggest that brain images will be proffered
by more lawyers in more cases in more contexts for more pur-
poses in the future.
On one hand, the issues for the legal system are simply the
same as they long have been: What might the proffered evi-
dence tell us that may help us to answer legally identified ques-
tions in fair, effective, and efficient ways? Brain imaging is sim-
ply the latest high-tech tool to be offered for its potential assis-
tance in this age-old enterprise.
On the other hand, brain imaging represents a perfect storm
of power, to be used or abused. It combines the authoritative
patina enjoyed by scientific evidence generally, and the allure of
all-modern brain science specifically, with the seductive power
of visual images.
How the legal system will ultimately deal with the exoge-
nous shock of such technologically, rhetorically, and visually
powerful information remains to be seen. To deal with it well,
however, the legal system will need the combined efforts and
advice of many legal and neuroscientific scholars,31 such as
those populating the MacArthur Foundation Research Network
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32. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neu-
roscience, http://www.lawneuro.org.
33. Gruter Institute, http://www.gruterinstitute.org.
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on Law and Neuroscience,32 the Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research,33 and the Society for Evolutionary Analy-
sis in Law (SEAL).34 And, fortunately, many efforts are under-
way. In the meantime, judges likely to encounter brain images
in their work would be well-advised to lay carefully constructed
mental templates, on which to hang existing and future infor-
mation emerging from brain-imaging communities. We hope
that what we have discussed here will provide a useful means
for doing so.
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